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Abstract: Is humanitarian intervention really a solution to humanitarian crises? This 
article will attempt to provide evidence that without serious re-evaluation of the 
mechanisms whereby military and socioeconomic humanitarian intervention is carried 
out internationally, humanitarian intervention cannot be more than a "Band-Aid solution" 
to improving the situation of intended beneficiaries. To prove this point, the short- and 
long-term benefits and disadvantages of humanitarian intervention during and in the 
wake of the Rwandan genocide will be examined and evaluated. Particular attention will 
be paid to the repercussions of socioeconomic humanitarian intervention. It is 
concluded that humanitarian aid in Rwanda was of greater economic than humanitarian 
benefit. Subsequently, policy recommendations will be made to improve the benefit of 
future humanitarian interventions by creating a United Nations standing army, 
increasing international commitment to providing disinterested aid, and by creating a 
pool of financial resources exclusively dedicated to preserving human rights and 
addressing humanitarian crises. 
 
Résumé: Est-ce que l'intervention humanitaire est vraiment une solution aux crises 
humanitaires? Cet article tentera de démontrer que, sans réévaluation sérieuse des 
mécanismes par lesquels l'intervention humanitaire militaire et socio-économique est 
effectuée au niveau international, l'intervention humanitaire ne peut pas être plus qu’une 
«solution pansement» dans l’amélioration des conditions de vie des populations ciblées. 
Nous soutiendrons cette thèse en évaluant plus particulièrement les avantages à court 
et à long terme ainsi que les inconvénients de l'intervention humanitaire pendant et à la 
suite du génocide rwandais. Une attention particulière sera accordée aux répercussions 
socio-économiques de cette intervention humanitaire afin de démontrer qu’elle était plus 
économique qu’humanitaire. Nous ferons également des recommandations dans le but 
d’améliorer l’impact des interventions humanitaires à venir, notamment en suggérant la 
création d’une armée permanente des Nations Unies, d’accroître l’aide internationale 
désintéressée, et de créer un schème de financement exclusivement dédié à la 
préservation des droits de la personne et aux crises humanitaires. 
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One of the most significant changes brought about by World War II was the rise of the 
human rights movement and humanitarian intervention as articulated in the Geneva 
Conventions. In more recent times, humanitarian intervention has taken on a renewed 
significance. International responses to situations of civil strife in Egypt, Libya, Syria, 
and other states, as well as the rise of the Responsibility to Protect concept1 have 
brought humanitarian intervention to the forefront of many discussions in the field of 
International Studies. This article will consider short- and long-term effects of 
humanitarian intervention and aid in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide. The paper’s 
assertion is that humanitarian intervention did not have a truly positive impact on the 
country's well-being in terms of human rights and security, but that humanitarian 
intervention primarily served as a “Band-Aid solution” for the fundamental issues which 
arose in the wake of the genocide. 
 While humanitarian intervention has a variety of definitions, this essay considers 
Kyrre Grimstad's definition: "interference by one or several states in the internal affairs 
of another state [...] to prevent a situation where the most basic rights of the people of 
that state [are] being violated".2 From this definition three main elements of 
humanitarian intervention are identified; the act, the actors, and the beneficiaries. As an 
act, humanitarian intervention focuses on the "obligation upon States to prevent or 
                                                     
 
 
1 Patricia O'Brien, (statement, 26th Annual Seminar for Diplomats on International Humanitarian Law, New 
York City, NY, March 4, 2009): para. 28-32, Accessed July 26, 2012, 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ola/media/info_from_lc/annual_seminar.pdf>. 
2 Kyrre Grimstad, " Humanitarian Intervention: Historical, Legal and Moral Perspectives" (LLM Thesis, 
University of Cape Town, 2001): 2, Accessed March 12, 2012, 
<http://www.publiclaw.uct.ac.za/usr/public_law/LLMPapers/grimstad.pdf>. 
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punish 'grave breaches'"3 as defined by the Geneva Conventions. For the purposes of 
this discussion, 'grave breaches' is understood to include "willful killing, torture or 
inhumane treatment; willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health; 
extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity 
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; taking of hostages; unlawful deportation or 
transfer (what is commonly referred to as 'ethnic cleansing')".4 Humanitarian 
intervention may take the form of military and/or socioeconomic aid. The actors or 
entities that provide humanitarian intervention include states or organizations within the 
international community. Military (such as the Canadian Forces) and non-military (such 
as Canadian International Development Agency and Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade) intervention is generally seen as legitimate when it receives 
approval from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). UNSC approval is an 
important factor because the UNSC is "the locus of decisions for humanitarian 
intervention"5 which suggests that the UNSC has the authority to approve humanitarian 
intervention on behalf of a state that is in need of such help. Consequently, it is United 
Nations (UN) initiatives, such as peacekeeping missions, which tend to provide the 
primary vehicle to execute military interventions. Western European and the United 
States Armed Forces seem to be the main actors in these initiatives because they have 
                                                     
 
 
3 "Never Again: Preventing genocide and punishing those responsible," United Nations Department of 
Public Information, Accessed March 12, 2012, 
<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/neveragain.shtml>. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Mohammed Ayoob, "Humanitarian Intervention and the International Society," Global Governance 7, 3 
(2001): 228. 
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the resources (e.g. weapons, transportation, funding, etc.) required to contribute 
significantly to humanitarian aid during a crisis. This is particularly true when the 
initiative's foreseeable outcomes are in line with national interests. Ongoing 
socioeconomic aid is often undertaken by both governmental and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). 
  The idealistic goal of humanitarian intervention is to alleviate human suffering 
and the violation of human rights, and to assist with recuperative efforts when human 
rights have been violated.6 As such, the intended beneficiary of humanitarian 
intervention is "the people of the target state".7 Contrary to this ideal, the Rwandan 
people suffered and human rights were violated during the genocide despite the 
apparent interventions made by the UNSC, military and non-military organizations. 
To show how humanitarian intervention superficially addressed the humanitarian 
issues during the genocide, an overview of the event is presented and the overall 
effects of military and socioeconomic humanitarian intervention in the short- and long-
term are assessed and compared. Key observations from the assessment are used to 
recommend policy changes that may achieve the altruistic goal of humanitarian 
intervention. The paper ends with a series of conclusions about the effectiveness of 
international aid in connection with the Rwandan genocide. 
 
                                                     
 
 
6 There are often a number of goals and this nominal goal is generally one of the weakest motivators for 
government actors though it is not said publicly by leaders. It is more frequently a major motivator for 
NGOs and Civil Rights agencies. 
7 Grimstad, " Humanitarian Intervention: Historical, Legal and Moral Perspectives," 5. 
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The Rwandan Genocide 
This case study provides an overview of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and examines 
how international humanitarian intervention in post-genocide Rwanda positively and 
negatively impacted its intended beneficiaries in the short term and the long term. The 
negative effects highlighted in this case study force us to re-examine humanitarian 
intervention policies in order to provide an adequate response to human rights crises 
and achieve the idealistic goal of humanitarian intervention. 
 The Rwandan genocide was the result of years of tension and conflict between 
two ethnic groups in Rwanda: the Hutu and the Tutsi. The tension appeared at the end 
of the 19th century when the Rwandan population was separated into three distinct 
castes; the ruling Tutsi (14%), the working class Hutu (85%), and the Twa (1%).8 The 
conflict was between the Hutu and the Tutsi. In 1918, following World War I, Rwanda 
was deemed a mandate of Belgium by the League of Nations and in 1959 Belgian 
support allowed the Hutu to overthrow Tutsi rule.9 Rwanda became independent in 
1962 and in 1973 the moderate (non-oppressive) Hutu government was overturned thus 
allowing a more radical (anti-Tutsi) Hutu government, under which the genocide 
occurred, to take its place.10 
 In 1990 the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), an army composed of mostly Tutsi 
Rwandan exiles, attacked Rwanda from Uganda.11 The ensuing war lasted for three 
                                                     
 
 
8 Robinson, "The Tragedy of Rwanda," 53. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Leitenberg, "Rwanda, 1994: International incompetence produces genocide," 6. 
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years during which an "aggressive and exclusivist Hutu solidarity was consciously being 
forged in opposition to these despised outsiders [the Tutsi]".12 This conflict resulted in 
the creation of the Arusha Peace Agreement for a cessation of hostilities between the 
RPF and the Hutu government. Negotiations also resulted in the creation of the United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), which was a 2,500-person force 
meant to "monitor the ceasefire and contribute to the security of [the capital city] 
Kigali".13 
 The genocide is said to have begun on April 6, 1994 when the airplane carrying 
Hutu President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of 
Burundi was shot down just outside of Kigali.14 The killing was carried out by the Hutu 
"Rwandan army, interahamwe, and party militias"15 which targeted not only Tutsi but 
Hutu opposition members, Hutu moderates, media critics, professionals, and others 
who opposed the Hutu-supremacist regime.16 The genocide as the "exclusive 
concentration on the mass elimination of all Tutsi"17 did not begin until April 12. In the 




                                                     
 
 
12 Organization of African Unity [OAU], "Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide," (African Union, 2000), 
Accessed March 4, 2012, para. 3.14, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d1da8752.html>. 
13 Holly Burkhalter, "A preventable horror?, " Africa Report, 39.6 (1994): 17. 
14 Ibid. 
15 OAU, ""Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide," para. 14.22. 
16 Ibid., para. 14.35-38. 
17 Ibid., para. 14.3. 
18 Ibid., para. 14.2. 
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Short Term Effects 
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
obliges "all States to prevent or punish acts of genocide".19 There was clear evidence 
that the international community had been made aware that the situation in Rwanda met 
the Genocide Convention's definition of genocide as early as August 1993 and yet once 
the genocide had begun "[w]eeks were wasted in determining whether the killing fully 
met the strict legal definition of 'genocide'".20 The international community had a 
delayed response to the genocide, largely due to "criticism and opposition by the United 
States".21 As such, no military action was taken in the interest of human rights in the 
midst of the "concentrated frenzy of mass murder".22 The delay of the international 
community in addressing "the gross crimes against humanity it knew were being 
committed"23 was a significant failure to uphold the Geneva human rights conventions. 
 Potentially more shocking was the misuse of UNAMIR during the genocide. 
Under the Arusha Peace Agreement, UNAMIR had been dispatched to Kigali and 
consequently, it was there when the slaughter began in the city. The mission was 
initially "forbidden to intervene if it meant using force".24 Canadian General Romeo 
Dallaire had requested new Rules of Engagement so that his troops could "protect 
                                                     
 
 
19 "Never Again: Preventing genocide and punishing those responsible." 
20 Douglas G. Anglin, "Rwanda: the preventable genocide. The Report of the International Panel of 
Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda & the Surrounding Events," 
International Journal 56, 1 (2001): 149. 
21 Milton Leitenberg, "Rwanda, 1994: International incompetence produces genocide," Peacekeeping & 
International Relations 23, 6 (1994): 6. 
22 Lukin Robinson, "The Tragedy of Rwanda," Monthly Review 55, 7 (2003): 52. 
23 Anglin, "Rwanda: the preventable genocide. The Report of the International Panel of Eminent 
Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda & the Surrounding Events," 149. 
24 Robinson, "The Tragedy of Rwanda," 58. 
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innocent civilians".25 This request was rejected by UN Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali thus rendering General Dallaire's force little more than observers to the 
massacre. In mid-April Belgium withdrew 440 of its troops because "ten of its disarmed 
soldiers had been murdered on April 7 by members of the Presidential Guard".26 This 
was followed by the withdrawal of "several hundred Bangladeshi soldiers".27 On April 
21, the UNSC "voted unanimously to reduce UNAMIR to a skeleton force of just 250 
men".28 This mass reduction of UNAMIR military forces, coupled with its passive Rules 
of Engagement signified that the international community had essentially decided 
against providing humanitarian military intervention. Thus, military aid during the 
Rwandan genocide was virtually non-existent. The only positive effect came from 
General Dallaire whose well-known efforts to expose the genocide to the world through 
public media helped bring attention to the crisis. 
 The genocide ended on July 18, 1994 when the RPF finally defeated the 
Rwandan army.29 Hundreds of thousands of people had been killed in the conflict and it 
was at this point that the international community as a whole began to play an active 
role in the recovery of the war-torn nation by implementing a socioeconomic programme 
that was intended to provide aid to the Rwandan people. This aid resulted in a variety of 
short-term effects, some of which are considered below. 
                                                     
 
 
25 Leitenberg, "Rwanda, 1994: International incompetence produces genocide," 6. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Burkhalter, "A preventable horror?." 
28 Ibid. 
29 Robinson, "The Tragedy of Rwanda," 57. 
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 Relative to the military inaction during the genocide, the socioeconomic aid 
provided after the genocide was very effective. In the short term, Jeff Drumtra, an Africa 
policy analyst, called Rwanda "a post-genocide society that [had] also experienced civil 
war, massive refugee displacement, [...] and economic ruin".30 Today, Rwanda has 
come to be "hailed for its remarkable socioeconomic recovery".31 The change is, in 
large part, due to international socioeconomic intervention and commitment to social 
and economic reform in the country. 
 Following the victory of the RPF, Rwanda was left with only minimal remnants of 
an economy, no infrastructure, and was a nation of people with physical and 
psychological needs to be met.32 It was a country which had experienced massive 
human rights violations and which continued to experience human insecurity as a result 
of uncertainty about future procurement of basic needs. In the weeks after the genocide 
ended, the "international community and the media opened their eyes and [...] 
overflowed with sympathy and help".33 Between 1994 and 2000 the international 
community sent the new Rwandan government "nearly $4 billion in aid".34 Although this 
economic aid provided some help to the country in the short-term, for reasons which will 
                                                     
 
 
30 Jeff Drumtra, U.S. Committee for Refugees, Life After Death: Suspicion and Reintegration in Post-
Genocide Rwanda, (1998), 41-42, quoted in Organization of African Unity, Rwanda: The Preventable 
Genocide (2000), para. 17.1. 
31 Bert Ingelaere, "Do We Understand Life after Genocide? Center and Periphery in the Construction of 
Knowledge in Postgenocide Rwanda," African Studies Review 53, 1 (2010): 41. 
32 OAU, "Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide," para. 17.2. 
33 Robinson, "The Tragedy of Rwanda," 57. 
34 Anglin, "Rwanda: the preventable genocide. The Report of the International Panel of Eminent 
Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda & the Surrounding Events," 149. 
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be discussed in the next section, it was not of lasting benefit to the Rwandan people 
and State. 
 The most noteworthy negative short-term effect of international humanitarian 
intervention was that foreign economic aid essentially reduced Rwanda's autonomy and 
complicated its recovery. A report commissioned by the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) says that "Rwanda's economic difficulties [were] compounded by its great 
dependence on external funds".35 Autonomy was reduced because "loans come with 
heavy conditions"36 thus making Rwanda "almost completely dependent on satisfying 
criteria imposed by the IMF and World Bank"37 to receive loans. This reliance on foreign 
aid effectively eliminated the new Rwandan government's sovereignty and indebted the 
state to the international community. 
 In addition to causing economic dependence, foreign economic intervention 
complicated recovery because the aid which was required for rebuilding the nation was 
not fully provided. By September 1994 the international community had pledged only 
≈14% of the funds necessary "for investigating the genocide and putting foreign 
monitors in place to ensure human rights abuses finally stop for good".38 This left the 
Rwandan government without the resources needed to secure the country against 
hostile parties and to begin rebuilding the nation's infrastructure in earnest. At the time it 
appeared that slow foreign contribution to rebuilding human security in Rwanda might 
                                                     
 
 
35 OAU, "Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide," para. 23.14. 
36 Ibid., para. 23.20. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Paul Watson, "Purging the evil," Africa Report, 39.6 (1994): 14. 
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leave room for former Hutu, who had committed the genocide and fled the country, to 
return and begin a guerrilla war.39 Although short-term socioeconomic humanitarian 
intervention helped provide much-needed funds, the minimal financial contribution and 
the consequent delays in recovery due to dependence on the international community 
were clearly not beneficial and in fact increased threats to human security. 
 Other humanitarian intervention included legal aid.  In November 1994, Paul 
Watson wrote that "it will be impossible to bury the past along with [the corpses] as long 
as thousands of suspected murderers hide from justice in refugee camps just across 
Rwanda's borders".40 This was especially true immediately following the genocide. The 
Rwandan legal infrastructure had been decimated and could not viably hope to carry out 
justice against the perpetrators of the genocide itself.41 Thus, the international 
community had the opportunity to intervene socially by providing a source of legal 
accountability in hopes of bringing reconciliation for some of the human rights violations 
it had allowed to be committed. 
 Legal intervention came in the form of the Arusha Tribunal. The Arusha Tribunal 
was officially created in November 1994 when the UNSC approved Resolution 955.42 
The Resolution created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) which 
was intended to "judge persons accused of genocide and crimes against humanity".43 
 Between 1994 and 1999 the ICTR convicted 7 people, some of whom "were 





41 OAU, "Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide," para. 18.4. 
42 Ibid., para. 18.10. 
43 Ibid., para. 18.14. 
  12 
 
among the leaders of the genocide".44 For example Jean Kambanda, the Prime Minister 
during the genocide, who "pleaded guilty to the crime of genocide",45 received a life 
sentence in prison.46 In bringing such perpetrators before a legitimate legal body, the 
ICTR not only meted out justice, but showed that the international community was at 
least nominally involved in recovery efforts. Further, the ICTR brought about 
reconciliation by satiating a thirst for justice in the short term when it was most 
immediately necessary. 
 
Long Term Effects 
International humanitarian intervention has also affected Rwanda in the long term. 
Typically, military intervention occurs during the peak of a crisis and its outcome often 
provides a stable, safe, and secure environment for socioeconomic intervention to take 
root and grow and positively impact the intended beneficiaries. As stated earlier, military 
action was non-existent, had no lasting effect, and likely worsened conditions for the re-
stabilization of the state and therefore it was not surprising that the socioeconomic aid 
provided was not of great assistance.  
 After the genocide, the ICTR continued to be beneficial for reconciliation, which is 
an important component in the rectification of human rights violations. Since 1994, the 
Arusha Tribunal has "convicted and sentenced 25 former government and military 
                                                     
 
 
44 Ibid., para. 18.21. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., para. 18.28. 
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leaders and owners of media organizations involved in hate media".47 Of these leaders 
of the genocide, 11 have been sentenced since 2000, testifying to the international 
community's lasting dedication to defending human rights and showing victims of 
human rights abuses that justice is being done. 
 Additionally, it seems that initial and continuing socioeconomic aid to Rwanda 
has brought about socioeconomic advancement. A 2011 World Bank Brief on Rwanda 
says that the country is "consolidating gains in social development and accelerating 
growth while ensuring that they are broadly shared to mitigate risks to eroding the 
country's hard-won political and social stability".48 This means that the aid provided by 
the international community has manifested itself in the long term in Rwanda's 
"impressive development progress since the 1994 genocide and civil war".49 
 Two prime examples of Rwanda's development are the growth of its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and recent trends in its Human Development Index 
(HDI) score. These are good indicators of development because they are universal 
standards commonly used to measure the economic and social health of states, which 
means that it is possible to compare them among different states. Between 1978 and 
1993, the fifteen years leading up to the genocide, Rwanda's GDP per capita rose at an 
average of 12.3% per year.50 Between 1994 and 2009, the fifteen years following the 
                                                     
 
 
47 "Never Again: Preventing genocide and punishing those responsible." 
48 "Rwanda: Country Brief," The World Bank Group, Accessed March 14, 2012, 
<http://go.worldbank.org/YP79K5BDT0>. 
49 Ibid. 
50 "Per capita GDP at current prices - US dollars," United Nations Statistics Division, last modified January 
16, 2012, Accessed March 15, 2012, 
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genocide, Rwanda's GPD per capita rose at an average of 15.9% per year.51 Between 
1990 and 2011, Rwanda's average HDI growth rate was 2.97%.52 This may seem small, 
but it should be noted that Rwanda's average HDI growth rate during this period was 
higher than that of any other country measured by the United Nations Development 
Programme during the same period.53 Both GDP and HDI indicate a high rate of growth 
after the genocide which, due to Rwanda's dependence on "foreign agencies, 
governments and NGOs for any number of programmes that are crucial to rehabilitation, 
reconciliation and development",54 can be attributed to foreign intervention. 
 The negative long-term effects of socioeconomic intervention have manifested 
themselves in a less obvious manner than the positive effects but are much deeper and 
more closely linked to human rights. The economic aid actually obscured social and 
human rights issues in Rwanda because "the Rwandan establishment operating at the 
center of society is crafting a preferred image of the country".55 The main issue being 
obscured is a lack of real reconciliation among Rwandans, especially in rural areas.56 
When asked about the Gacaca process (a Rwandan criminal court) Rwandans living in 






52 "Human Development Index trends, 1980-2011," United Nations Statistics Division, last modified 
December 20, 2011, Accessed March 15, 2012, 
<http://data.un.org/DocumentData.aspx?q=rwanda+hdi&id=269>. 
53 Ibid. 
54 OAU, "Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide," para. 23.16. 
55 Ingelaere, "Do We Understand Life after Genocide? Center and Periphery in the Construction of 
Knowledge in Postgenocide Rwanda". 
56 For an analysis of other issues in the wake of the Rwandan genocide refer to Ingelaere, "Do We 
Understand Life after Genocide? Center and Periphery in the Construction of Knowledge in Postgenocide 
Rwanda". 
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rural areas refuted its benefit, accusing it of "bringing neither reconciliation nor justice".57 
In rural areas, locals give the impression that there is still distrust and tension among 
the people rather than the front of unity projected by the government. Despite 
appearances of positive economic growth, Rwanda has yet to overcome the 
consequences of the human rights violations that occurred during the conflict  period. 
 A second negative long-term effect of foreign intervention is heavy economic 
dependence on foreign aid. For example, in 2001, foreign aid made up approximately 
40% of the Rwandan government's budget.58 This represents an extremely unhealthy 
dependence on outside sources. One needs to ask the question, “if all foreign aid was 
removed tomorrow, would the country de-stabilize?” The likely answer is “yes”, because 
the government would lose a key source of income as well as legitimacy with its own 
people. In such a situation it is not difficult to imagine a return to pre-genocide 
conditions. 
 In summary, we see that the short-term effects of international intervention in the 
case of the 1994 Rwandan genocide include ineffective military intervention, except to 
alert the world about the genocide, the immediate infusion of international financial aid 
following the genocide, and legal aid in the form of the ICTR.  The long-term effects 
include continuing financial aid as well as the ICTR continuing to bring about 
reconciliation, however this has produced an unhealthy dependency on external 
financial aid and the appearance of reconciliation on the world stage.. 




58 "Rwanda: Country Brief." 
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Policy Recommendations 
The evidence above comparing short- and long-term effects of military and 
socioeconomic humanitarian intervention in connection to the Rwandan genocide 
provides support for a variety of observations that may lead to policy changes. Based 
on the evidence presented in the paper, we see that humanitarian intervention in 
Rwanda proved to be of little short-term benefit in providing for the humanitarian needs 
of Rwandans and the Rwandan State. In the short term, the negative effects brought 
about by economic dependency vastly outweigh the positive effects of economic aid, 
however the creation of the ICTR seemed to have had a strong positive impact in the 
short term. Conversely, in the long term, the reconciliation brought about by the ICTR 
appears to have been largely constructed to preserve appearances. In addition, 
economic dependence has not diminished, however the benefit of economic growth due 
to the infusion of foreign aid seems to outweigh the negative effect of dependence since 
economic growth and stability may create conditions for future independence. Overall, 
international humanitarian intervention has been of greater economic benefit than social 
and psychological benefit to its intended beneficiaries. 
 In light of these observations, some policy recommendations seem appropriate 
for future humanitarian intervention. First, the international community should develop a 
mechanism whereby decisions regarding military intervention can be made quickly, for 
example a UN standing army. This would hopefully minimize the sort of debate and 
inaction which was seen in 1994. Second, the international community should provide 
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"generous and disinterested aid"59 to countries in the aftermath of humanitarian crises 
such as genocide. This would allow governments to rebuild while strengthening the 
integrity of their sovereignty in an environment of fragile human security. Third, the 
international community should create a pool of financial resources dedicated to 
preventing human rights abuses and providing humanitarian intervention and aid which 
would be independent of any individual state. This would allow for intervention and aid 
to be dispensed without having to wait for the interests of individual, self-interested 
states to favour donating to projects of humanitarian intervention. As the UNSC is 
typically seen as the most legitimate source of humanitarian intervention, it would be the 
prime candidate for implementing these policies to address future humanitarian crises. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper considered how military and socioeconomic humanitarian intervention in 
Rwanda impacted the country's situation both in the short and long term. Military 
humanitarian intervention proved to have very little effect due to the many limitations 
imposed on UNAMIR. Socioeconomic humanitarian intervention in Rwanda proved to 
have predominantly negative short-term effects in that it did not intervene before the 
genocide took place nor did it provide adequate economic support for rebuilding the 
shattered nation but increased Rwanda's dependence on the international community 
for foreign financial aid. Despite the failings of military humanitarian intervention and 
                                                     
 
 
     59. Robinson, "The Tragedy of Rwanda," 58. 
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economic aid, international socioeconomic humanitarian intervention in the form of legal 
aids, such as the ICTR, did appear to provide justice and foster reconciliation in the 
short term. In the long term, however, economic growth overshadowed the 
reconciliation process which, from the people’s perspective, failed. International 
intervention and aid following the 1994 genocide left the Rwandan people and State in a 
situation where being the intended beneficiaries of international intervention has 
superficially improved their well-being and economy, but has increased their 
dependence on foreign aid, and has failed to create true reconciliation. 
 From the evidence provided by the case of the Rwandan genocide, it can be 
concluded that the humanitarian intervention was oriented less toward truly improving 
the fundamental well-being and human rights of its intended beneficiaries than it was 
toward simply showing people that help was being given and helping creating some 
degree of economic stability. But international aid cannot be a smokescreen of 
economic or nominal benefits. If the international community were to respond to all 
humanitarian crises as it did to the Rwandan genocide it is unlikely that any state or 
people groups in need of aid would truly get the aid that they desperately need.  In 
future, the international community, and especially the UNSC, must seek to provide aid 
quickly and without thought of appearances on the world stage if humanitarian 
intervention is ever to be anything more than a "Band-Aid solution". 
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